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In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well-
known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, 
and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend 
to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to 
defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s 
argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in 
favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer 
experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism.
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One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about 
perceptual experiences has been formulated by M.G.F. Martin in his paper The Trans-parency of 
Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims 
which are jointly inconsistent.1
(i) As reflection on the phenomenal character of visualising an external thing reveals,
it is not neutral about the presence of the visualised thing in the imagined situation.
(ii) At least in some cases, visualising an external thing consists in imagining a visual
perception of it.
(iii) But imagining a visual perception of an external thing is neutral about the latter’s
presence in the imagined situation.
Given that visualising cannot be non-neutral and identical with a neutral form of imagining at the 
same time, one of the three claims has to go. Martin presents detailed argu-ments in favour of (i) and 
(ii) and concludes that we should give up (iii). Intentionalists, on the other hand, typically attack (i) or 
(ii), while holding on to (iii). In this paper, I would like to suggest that the intentionalist response gets 
its target wrong: instead of trying to under-mine one of the first two claims, it should instead raise 
doubts about the last. In particular, I argue that intentionalism has the resources to ensure and explain 
the non-neutrality involved in imagining and perceiving something.
Much of the paper will be concerned with a reconstruction of Martin’s complex argu-ment. 
Intentionalists have been misunderstanding key steps in his line of reasoning, so that
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it is worthwhile to explore where they went wrong, and why the challenge raised by Martin
is real. The resulting formulation of the argument against intentionalism may very well be
more mine than Martin’s. My goal is not to provide a scholarly introduction to Martin’s
writings, but instead to make his case against intentionalism as strong as possible.
Having a detailed look at the problems which visualising poses for theories of perceptual
experience makes it possible to find a satisfactory response on behalf of intentionalism.
Indeed, it will turn out that some aspects of visualising thereby discovered actually
favour intentionalism over disjunctivism.
The version of intentionalism to be defended here differs significantly from those
currently en vogue – most notably in linking intentionality essentially to consciousness,
and in assuming a self-presentational (i.e. experiential and self-reflexive) element as part
of perceptual (and other kinds of) intentionality.2 It may therefore be aptly labelled
experiential intentionalism. Much of the paper will be devoted to showing that, while
many current versions of intentionalism cannot provide a satisfactory answer to Martin’s
challenge, experiential intentionalism can do so. Experiential intentionalism is thus to be
preferred, not only over disjunctivism, but also over other versions of intentionalism.
In the first section, I introduce the intentionalist and the disjunctivist approaches to
perceptual experience and contrast their distinct accounts of the transparency and non-
neutrality of perceptions.3 The next three sections elaborate on why we should accept
the claims (i) and (ii), respectively, and why intentionalists have been misguided in rejecting
them. In particular, the nature of experiential imagination – that is, imagining an experience
– and that of imaginative projects involving the former are considered in detail. The fifth
section is intended to illustrate why current forms of intentionalism cannot avoid the
challenge posed by Martin’s argument for thesis (iii). It also aims to illustrate how both dis-
junctivism and experiential intentionalism can do better, especially with respect to an expla-
nation of the transparency and non-neutrality of visualising. In the final section, I use the
previous discussions about what it means to imagine having a perceptual experience in
order to formulate an objection against disjunctivism. I conclude with some remarks
about the fact that experiential imagination seems to involve two different objects of aware-
ness, namely the imagined experience and the latter’s own object.
1. Intentionalism and disjunctivism
Intentionalism and disjunctivism disagree about the nature of perceptual experience. That
is, they put forward different accounts of the first-personal side of our perceptual awareness
of external things and their features. But they do so before a background of common
assumptions and observations. One is that perceptual awareness differs from propositional
thought in showing us objects, rather than describing, naming or indexing them. This con-
trast is not restricted to the realm of the mental. It also characterises the difference between,
say, pictures and sentences. Another, closely related shared observation is that perceptions
are not merely about objects, but take them to be a certain way: they are non-neutral about
how things are. This aspect distinguishes perceptions, for instance, from desires which may
also be directed at objects, but do not involve a claim about how they are.4 And finally, both
parties agree that perceptions are immediate in that they present their objects as part of our
actual environment. That is, their non-neutrality concerns the actual presence of things
before our senses. This perceptual commitment about how things actually are is reflected
in the fact that perceptions enjoy epistemic authority over our beliefs about our actual
environment. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of perceptions is salient from the first-
person perspective, as part of their transparency. Perceptions are transparent insofar as
introspective attention to them reveals the external things and features of which they make
us aware, and no other candidate objects of awareness (such as sense-data or mental
pictures). The positive element of this aspect of the phenomenal character of perceptions
– of what perceptions are like for the subject – consists in their non-neutrality: when
attending to our perceptions, we find objects that are given to us as part of our actual
environment.
However, intentionalism and disjunctivism provide different theories of how percep-
tions relate us to external things, and of why they are non-neutral and immediate. Intention-
alism about perceptual experiences does not distinguish between perceptions and
hallucinations when addressing these issues. It maintains that perceptual experiences –
whether they are veridical or not – make us intentionally aware of those entities. Accord-
ingly, they are understood as presenting us with external objects without requiring their
existence. They are non-relational appearances of things which do not involve the latter
as their constituents. Moreover, intentionalism characterises the form of intentionality
common to both perceptions and hallucinations as distinctively perceptual. This means
that they involve a specific intentional attitude towards their objects which takes the
latter to be actually present before us. This explains why they are committal to aspects
of our actual environment, and why they have authority over our respective beliefs.5
Given that perceptions and hallucinations are said not to differ in respect of how they
make us subjectively aware of things, intentionalism concludes that they share the same
phenomenal character and are therefore of the same fundamental kind of experience.6
By contrast, disjunctivism about perceptual experiences (as it is defended by Martin)
maintains that there is an essential difference between the character of perceptions and
the character of hallucinations, to the effect that they belong to different fundamental
kinds of experience. The difference in question is that, while perceptions make us relation-
ally aware of objects, hallucinations do not.7 That perceptual awareness is relational means
that the character of perceptions – and thus the perceptions themselves – are constituted by
the external objects of which they make us aware. This explains why we find those objects
when reflecting on our perceptions, and also why the latter are non-neutral about the pres-
ence of the former in the situation before our senses.
Intentionalism and disjunctivism, so defined, are incompatible with each other. They
provide rival accounts of how perceptual experiences make us aware of objects and
which character(s) they show. And they give different answers to the question of
whether perceptions and hallucinations belong to the same fundamental kind of experience.
Nonetheless, it will become important in the last two sections that intentionalism can
endorse – if not in fact, then at least in spirit – some of the central ideas of disjunctivism,
such as the priority of perceptions over hallucinations.
In particular, it may be argued that perceptual experiences do not only have a first-
personal side to them, but also a third-personal side. The disjunctivist position considered
so far has been concerned with how to conceive of perceptual object awareness – that is, of
how it is for the conscious mind to be presented with objects. But when we are perceiving
something, we also stand in interesting causal or similar relations to the world, which are
missing in the case of hallucination and which can be investigated from the perspective
of the natural and cognitive sciences. It is surely not uncontroversial whether these third-
personally accessible, structural features of our cognition of objects should really figure
in an account of the nature of our predominantly first-personal experience of objects. But
the two phenomena are clearly related (e.g. we can influence our perceptual awareness
of things by influencing our structural relation to the world). In particular, if there is
indeed a difference in character between perceptions and hallucinations, it is very likely
to be due to some structural difference between cases in which we perceive something and
cases in which we hallucinate something. That is, it should be expected that any consti-
tutional difference between the two kinds of perceptual experience is accompanied by –
and perhaps also partly derivable from – a difference in some causal or similar element.
This leaves room for a version of intentionalism which, despite claiming that percep-
tions and hallucinations possess the same character, accepts that the two differ structurally
– perhaps even essentially so. In this way, intentionalism can accommodate the (fairly)
uncontroversial idea that, while some intentional experiences (i.e. perceptions) relate us
to the world, others (i.e. hallucinations) do not. It just takes the relation in question to
be, not a relation of awareness, but some other kind of relation that is accessible to empirical
investigation. If we label the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ also in charac-
ter phenomenal (or naive realist) disjunctivism, and the view that they differ merely in
structure structural disjunctivism, then we can say that intentionalism is compatible with
the structural variant of disjunctivism, but not with the phenomenal one. Intentionalism
can accordingly even assume that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature –
namely in their third-personal side. However, if not stated otherwise, my focus in what
follows will be on the phenomenal version of disjunctivism. And I will understand inten-
tionalism as being neutral on the issue of whether the structural difference between percep-
tions and hallucinations amounts to a difference in nature.
2. The transparency of visualising
Perceptual awareness is not the only form of object awareness which is transparent and
committal. Imaginative experiences – and, notably, visualising – possess both features
as well (Martin 2003, 413ff.).8 Most of all, episodes of visualising, too, enjoy some kind
of epistemic authority over our beliefs – this time only over our beliefs about what is
part of the imagined situations. It makes sense to ask which entities are part of the possible
situation that we are visualising at a given moment. And our answer should be influenced by
what we are visualising, given that the latter typically determines what is contained in the
imagined world. Other things equal, if it is a green tree that we are visualising, then there is a
green tree in the situation that we are imagining. Hence, picking up on what we are visua-
lising should guide us in forming beliefs about what is part of the respective imagined
situation. This authority of visualising over our beliefs about the imagined world may be
countered, or perhaps need not always be present. For instance, we may visualise a
green tree simply as part of imagining having a hallucination of a green tree, in which
case we should not believe that there is a ‘hallucinated’ green tree in the imagined
world, but at best that there is a hallucinatory experience as of such a tree.
The epistemic dimension of visualising becomes important in cases where we are using
visualising to acquire knowledge – say, about possibilities or conditional truths.9 In his
most recent book, Timothy Williamson argues that visualising is one of the many empirical
capacities that we may employ in order to acquire modal knowledge – or, in his concrete
example, knowledge of some conditional, which forms the first step to modal knowledge.
Considering a situation in the mountains, he describes the largely non-inferential process
involved in coming to know that a certain rock would have landed in a lake, if its path
had not been blocked by a bush:
You notice one rock slide into a bush. You wonder where it would have ended if the bush had
not been there. A natural way to answer the question is by visualizing the rock sliding without
the bush there, then bouncing down the slope. You thereby come to know this counterfactual:
[. . .] If the bush had not been there, the rock would have ended in the lake. (Williamson
2008, 42)
Acquiring knowledge in this way is possible only if, by visualising the rock, the slope and
the lake, we take them all to be part of the same possible situation. And this requires that our
episode of imagining is committed to their existence in that situation. Two things need to be
noted about this commitment. The first has already been hinted at: it is not trivial to claim
that the visualised object is part of the imagined situation. The example of a desire for some-
thing (e.g. an ice-cream) shows that there can be mental states which are object-directed, but
do not take a stance on how things are in a certain world.10
The second point to consider is that the non-neutrality linked to visualising cannot be
external to it, that is, derive from its further intellectual context rather than from the
basic episode of visualising itself. The distinction between the episode and its context is
not meant to deny that simple instances of visualising – or ‘images’, if one prefers –
may include intellectual or other non-sensory elements (e.g. the presentation of objects
as mind-dependent or -independent). An episode of visualising differs from the additional
thoughts in two other respects, namely that the former is an instance of object awareness,
and that it may occur without the latter – although it may also form a more complex ima-
ginative project with them. Now, that we end up being committed to the presence of what is
visualised in the imagined situation is due to the fact that visualising itself is committal in
this way. That visualising presents us with, say, a green tree is not neutral on whether there
is such a green tree in the imagined world (rather than, say, a yellow flower, or no such
object at all). We may cancel out this commitment by adding the thought that, within the
imagined world, the green tree is merely hallucinated and therefore not really part of that
world. But, as a default, visualising takes the visualised object to be part of the imagined
situation.
If it were instead neutral on this issue, the commitment would have to come from some
additional thought specifying that the imagined situation indeed contains whatever is visu-
alised. The green tree would become part of the imagined world, not by being visualised,
but instead by being thought to be part of that world. This is in fact, roughly, the view
suggested by Burge as an alternative to the disjunctivist’s take on visual experience. For
him, the commitment to the presence of the visualised object – or, in the case of visualising
an external thing by imagining a perception of it, the veridicality of the latter – in the ima-
gined world comes not with the basic episode of visualising, but instead with a supposi-
tional thought accompanying the first. Note, however, that Burge uses the term
‘visualizing’ to denote the complex and committal imaginative project which contains
not only the simple visual presentation or image, but also the additional supposition:
[One begins] with the supposition of veridicality. One simply takes the content of the imagined
experience to be veridical. [. . .] I hold that the imagery does not by itself guarantee the
presence of the imagined scene [. . .]. What gives us the imagined scene is the fact that we
are visualizing the scene. [. . .] The imagined veridicality is not derivative from the imagery
itself. Visualizing something with a given imagery has do to with how the imagery is used.
(Burge 2005, 65ff.)
But this alternative picture would not be able to pay justice to the character of visualising
(Martin 2003, 416ff.). To get clearer about this, consider the issue of what a neutral visual
presentation of an object would have to be like. When we are looking from a distance at a
perfect wax replica of a friend of ours and are completely in the grip of its illusionary effect,
it seems to us as if there really is our friend before us. That is, our visual experience is
committed to the presence of our friend in our environment, and we are bound to form the
respective belief. However, when we move closer to the figure and come to recognise it as
being just a wax replica, how things appear to us alters substantially. Now, it seems to us as
if there is a wax figure in front of us, and our experience commits us to accept its actual
existence before our eyes. Relatedly, although we continue to enjoy some kind of awareness
of our friend, our experience has stopped being non-neutral about his presence. So here we
have a case of visual object awareness, which in some sense is still about a particular object,
but which does not commit us to its presence in our actual environment. This neutrality,
however, has been gained by a change in the object of awareness. We are now presented
with a three-dimensional depiction of our friend, rather than with our friend himself.
Indeed, when introspecting our experience, we find the wax figure and its pictorial proper-
ties, but no human being. This explains why we are committal with respect to the former,
but not with respect to the latter.
In line with these considerations, if visualising were neutral about the presence of the
visualised object in the imagined situation, we should expect not to find that object, but
instead some substitute – such as an internal picture – when reflecting on our imaginative
experience. But this does not seem to be the case. When we introspect an episode of visua-
lising, what is revealed to us is the visualised object, and no other candidate object of aware-
ness. In other words, visualising is transparent, just like seeing is. The two kinds of visual
experience differ in their immediacy: while an episode of seeing presents its object as actu-
ally being there before us, visualising does not do this, but instead locates the object in the
imagined situation. There is, hence, good reason to accept the first claim in the triad intro-
duced at the beginning. As part of its transparent nature, visualising an external thing is by
default committed to the latter’s presence in the imagined situation. And this commitment
remains intact, as long as it is not cancelled out by some additional intellectual stipulations
about what is in fact imagined.
3. Visualising as imagining seeing
The second claim of the triad maintains that some instances of visualising an external thing
amount to instances of imagining a perception of such a thing. It is a special case of Martin’s
Dependency Thesis:11
[T]o imagine sensorily a w is to imagine experiencing a w [.]. (Martin 2003, 404)
Imagining a perception – or, more generally, experiential imagination – is a case of object
awareness, just as much as seeing or visualising an external thing is. What we are aware of
when imagining an experience is just that, some experience. More specifically, we are
aware of the first-personal side of an experience, that is, of its phenomenal character. We
imagine some experience by imagining some instantiation of its character. Its third-personal
side (if experiences have any) is, so to speak, ‘invisible’ to object-directed imagining. Of
course, we can have additional thoughts about it. But it is not presented as part of a case
of imagining with an experience as its object. The reason for this is that this form of
imagining is experiential, in the same sense in which seeing and visualising are visual.
Just as the latter are limited to the presentation of visible entities, experiential imagining
is restricted to the presentation of phenomenal aspects of mental episodes. The latter’s struc-
tural features lack an ‘experiential appearance’, so to speak. Again, experiential awareness
does not differ in this respect from, say, visual awareness. When we see or visualise a
lemon, we see or visualise its visual appearance, but not its biological nature, for example.
Intentionalists typically select the Dependency Thesis – and therefore also claim (ii) –
as the main target of their criticism of Martin’s argument against intentionalism. Indeed, if
imaginative experience is to be understood in the same intentional terms as perceptual
experience, it is difficult to understand why, say, seeing and visualising should not make
us aware of the same objects, namely external things. If perception does not involve an
awareness of an experience, why should imagination do so, if both are assumed to
involve the same kind of object awareness? This doubt should be taken serious – not
the least because it simply confirms that there is in fact a tension between the intentionalist
thesis and the claim (ii). While Martin draws the conclusion that the former should be given
up, it is also very plausible to question the latter.
Some of the intentionalist objections, however, seem to have misunderstood the
intended scope or nature of the claim at issue.12 A first point to be noted is that that
thesis (ii) need not have universal application for the argument against intentionalism to
go through. For this purpose, it is meant to be the claim that some cases are instances of
experiential imagining – and not the claim that this is true of all. More is not required
for the argument against intentionalism under consideration issue here. And more is also
not intended by Martin, or supported by his line of reasoning in favour of (ii) (Martin
2003, 404ff.).13
Another important issue is that this argument concentrates on, and exploits the special
features of, cases in which our episodes of visualising involve certain subjective properties.
Subjective properties are characterised by the fact that they are experience-dependent: their
instantiation is dependent on the occurrence of a specific experience. Martin’s focus is on
cases in which instances of visualising involve a certain kind of perspectivalness; and thesis
(ii) should be understood as being restricted to those cases (or to similar cases, such as ima-
ginative experiences involving aspects of painfulness or itchiness).14 What (ii) therefore
claims is that visualising is identical with imagining perceiving when it involves the
subjective perspectival element at issue.
By perceiving an object, we may acquire knowledge about the latter’s specific spatial
location. But our perception does not thereby place the object in objective space. When
we look at a building that is located roughly to the South-East of the bench on which we
are currently sitting, we do not see it as being to the South-East of that bench. In particular,
we do not perceive objects as being orientated in accordance with the cardinal directions.
Instead, we see them as being orientated towards ourselves – for instance, we see the build-
ing as being to our left. What this means is that we perceive objects as part of egocentric
space, and not as part of objective (or ‘absolute’) space.15 One manifestation of this fact
is that our perception of the building inclines and entitles us to judge that it is to our
actual left, but not that it is to the South-East of the bench. Coming to know the latter
requires additional information – notably about our own location and orientation in
objective space (Campbell 1995).
Nonetheless, our perceptions of egocentric locations are still as much concerned with
actual space as is our knowledge of objective locations. We see the building as being to
our actual left, as part of our actual environment. If this were not so, our experience
would not be able to provide us with all the information necessary to properly interact
with what we see – for example, to succeed in walking over to the actual building. But
that perception does provide us with this information is illustrated by the fact that such inter-
action does not require inferring the presence of the building to our actual left from perceiv-
ing it as being to our left and believing that such experiences are (typically) concerned with
the actual world. The issue of which world our perceptions are concerned with simply does
not arise – it is our world, the world in which we perceive. Something similar is true of the
temporal relevance of our perceptions: they concern our present environment. We see the
building as presently being to our left, and not as having been there in the past, or as
going to be there in the future.16
Part of our perception of the building as being to our actual left is implicit, however. We
do not explicitly experience ourselves and our spatial relation to the building when perceiv-
ing the latter. We are not among the entities presented to us by our experience. Of course, we
can see other perceivers – and even ourselves, say, by utilising a mirror or some similar
apparatus which turns us into the object of our own perceptions. But normally, when we
are simply subjects of perception and perceive the orientation of objects relative to us,
we do not see us, but only the objects. Our own perspective is only implicitly reflected
in our perceptual experiences, namely as the point of view orientated to which objects
are presented to us. As a consequence, what figures explicitly in our experience is not
the relational property of being to the left of us, but the monadic quality of being leftish.
It seems that such a quality can figure in perception in two different ways. The percep-
tual experience may instantiate the quality; or it may instead present an external object as
having that quality. In both cases, this has consequences for the phenomenal character of the
experience concerned. In the first case, the quality constitutes one of the non-presentational
aspects of that character. In the second case, it is a constituent of one of the character’s
presentational aspects.17 That the quality of leftishness figures in our perception of the
building therefore means that the latter instantiates a certain character aspect – either a
non-presentational aspect, or the presentational aspect of presenting the building as being
the monadic property of being to the left.18
Which view is to be preferred in the end does not matter here. Indeed, it is not so clear
whether they actually differ in any substantial way – which might explain why Martin
appears to switch between both views in some of his formulations (e.g. when talking
about the quality of itchiness). The step from acknowledging the presence of a
non-presentational aspect of the character of a perception to projecting this aspect onto
the perceived object is indeed small – as discussions about blur or similar phenomena illus-
trate (Peacocke 1983; Dorsch and Soldati forthcoming). Moreover, any presentation of
something as being leftish would lack the status and force of the presentation of it as
being to our actual and present left. In particular, we do not see the building as having the
monadic property of being to the left; and we are not inclined or entitled to believe it to gen-
uinely instantiate this property. Of course, we may say ‘the building is to the left’. But when
prompted, we will happily clarify that what we really meant was that it is to the left of us.
In any case, that the character of our perception of the building includes this phenom-
enal aspect – let us call it the aspect of leftishness – should not be doubted. We can attend to
it; and we can exploit it when drawing a picture of how the building looks like when seen
from our current point of view. That is, we can depict an object as being to our actual left by
drawing it on the left side of the canvas – instead of, say, by drawing both ourselves and the
object.19
But how is the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness linked to the perception of the
property of something as being at some specific location to our actual left? More generally,
how does the perspectivalness of an experience relate to the determination of what is experi-
enced? Martin’s insightful observation is that the former suffices for the latter (Martin 2003,
410). If an experience of an object exemplifies leftishness – that is, shows a respective
non-presentational phenomenal aspect or, alternatively, presents the object as being to
the left – then it is an experience of the object as being to our actual left. More specifically,
the presence of the perspectival aspect of leftishness is sufficient to ensure, first, that the
experience concerned is an experience of something as being to our left (rather than to
our right) and, second, that it is an experience of something as being to our actual left
(rather than to our left in a merely possible situation). Indeed, Martin claims even more,
namely that it also suffices for having a perceptual experience of something as being to
our actual left. This makes sense since the other two kinds of visual experience,
which may involve the aspect of leftishness, are not – or at least not in their simplest
forms – concerned with our current environment. Episodes of visualising present objects
as part of imagined situations (cf. below), while episodes of visual memory present
objects as part of past situations. I return below to the issue of how important this additional
claim is for Martin’s argument.
That the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness turns the respective experience into an
experience of something to our actual left is a direct consequence of the implicitness
involved in our perception of the spatial relations that objects bear to us in egocentric
space. As noted above, we see objects as being to our actual left (and not, say, as being
at an egocentric location in some merely possible space). But this relational property is typi-
cally not explicitly given to us. Instead, what figures in our experience is solely the monadic
quality of leftishness. Hence, we perceive the instantiation of the property of being to our
actual left simply by being aware of the quality of leftishness. When we see the building as
being to our actual left, no aspect of our perception but its aspect of leftishness plays a role
in determining that we experience the building at that specific location in our actual
environment. If the aspect of leftishness is taken to be presentational, this thought
becomes even more straightforward: our perception presents the building as being to our
actual left just by presenting it as being to the left; no other presentational element is
needed or involved. What we are confronted with here is the particular subjectivity of
the aspect of leftishness. Its actual instantiation is both necessary and sufficient for the
experience of something as being to our actual left.20
However, as Martin notes, these considerations about perception give rise to a puzzle in
the case of visualising (Martin 2003, 410). On the one hand, our episodes of visualising
involve the same kind of perspectivalness as our episodes of seeing (Hopkins 1998,
chap. 7). We visualise buildings as being to the left of certain subjective points of view.
And we normally do so without explicitly presenting those points of view or any subjects
occupying them. What figures in our respective imaginative experiences is therefore, again,
the monadic quality of leftishness, and not the relational property of being to the left of
some subject in the subject’s environment. But this means that our episodes of visualising
may involve the same phenomenal aspect of leftishness as our episodes of seeing. Indeed,
this is partly due to the relative simplicity of our visual presentation of the egocentric orien-
tations of objects. It is devoid of any explicit reference to the subject of experience and,
therefore, allows us to visualise something as being to the left without thereby visualising
it as being to the left of any particular subject.
On the other hand, when visualising buildings as being to the left of subjective points of
views, we need not – and typically do not – imagine them as being to our actual left. At
least in the simplest cases, our episodes of visualising do not locate their objects in our
actual environment, but instead in some imagined space (Wittgenstein 1984, 622 and
628; Sartre 2004, 8ff.).21 Of course, we can project our image onto our actual environment
by taking what we imagine to be part of actual space. But even then, there is no real com-
petition between what we see and what we visualise. For example, when looking at a certain
picture on our kitchen wall, we may visualise with open eyes how things would look if there
were a different picture at the same spot on the wall. But such a complex and mixed pres-
entation does not amount to a presentation of the impossible state of affairs of two pictures
occupying the same part of space.
So, episodes of visualising may involve the aspect of leftishness without presenting
something as being to our actual left. But due to the subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness
noted above, its instantiation is inseparably linked to the presentation of something as
possessing the relational property of being to our actual left. Hence, the instances of
visualising concerned cannot exemplify the aspect of leftishness. This raises the question
of how it is involved in visualising instead. Martin’s proposal is that, in visualising, we
imagine an experience as instantiating the aspect of leftishness – that is, we imagine a
perspectival experience of something as being to the left in the imagined situation. When
we visualise a building as being to the left, our imaginative episode does not instantiate
the aspect of leftishness. But it still involves the latter by representing another experience
as instantiating it.
The proposal captures the specific subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness. For it takes
the instantiation of that aspect in a certain world to be sufficient for the occurrence of an
experience of something as being located to the experiencing subject’s left in that very
same world. Actual perspectival experiences concern actual space, while imagined perspec-
tival experiences concern imagined space. Moreover, what needs to be imagined is a per-
ceptual experience. As noted above, other perspectival experiences are not concerned
with the current state of the world in which they themselves occur. Instead, they are con-
cerned with the past of that world (as in the case of visual recall), or with an entirely differ-
ent possible world (as in the case of visualising). Hence, neither episodic memories, nor
imaginative episodes can instantiate the subjective aspect of leftishness. If we want to
imagine an experience with that aspect, we therefore have to imagine a perspectival percep-
tion. This conclusion can also be inferred more directly fromMartin’s additional claim men-
tioned above, namely that the presence of leftishness suffices for the presence of perception.
Indeed, the reasoning put forward in support of that claim has been very similar to the one
rehearsed in the second half of this paragraph. But, strictly speaking, the additional claim
does not seem to be necessary for Martin’s argument.
Martin further illustrates this argument by comparing the subjective perspectivalness of
perceptions to the subjective aspects involved in some bodily sensations. His example are
experiences of itchiness; but experiences of pain are equally good candidates. Experiences
of pain instantiate the phenomenal aspect of painfulness: they are feelings of pain. More-
over, having a feeling of pain is sufficient for there actually being a pain and, hence, for
experiencing an actual pain. If we feel pain in a certain part of our leg, then that part of
our leg does indeed hurt – independently of whether its skin tissue is damaged, say.22
By contrast, merely imagining our leg as hurting does not involve the presentation of an
actual pain in our leg. But this raises, again, the question of how imagining a pain can
still involve the aspect of painfulness – which it clearly does, albeit possibly to a lesser
degree of intensity and determinacy than real feelings of pain. As above, the solution is
to understand imagining a pain as imagining a sensation of pain – that is, as imagining
an experience which instantiates the phenomenal aspect of painfulness.
This concludes what are, in essence, Martin’s considerations in favour of the thesis (ii).
However, the analogy with pain suggests a second route to the conclusion that visualising
the orientation of objects in egocentric space requires imagining perceiving that orientation.
Feeling a pain is not only sufficient for the existence of pain, it is also necessary for the
latter. Our leg does not really hurt if we do not feel pain. Of course, other things may distract
us so that we do not always notice the pain. But if we do not feel any pain in our leg, despite
being sufficiently attentive to the latter, it does not seem true to say that our leg in fact hurt.
In particular, bystanders cannot insist that we are in pain by pointing to some bodily damage
to our leg. Such evidence cannot trump our failure to feel pain. Accordingly, the
instantiation of pain requires an experience of that pain – and, presumably, as part of the
same world. Hence, imagining a pain has to involve imagining feeling that pain.
Now, egocentric orientational properties seem to be similarly subjective – opening up
the possibility of formulating a similar argument in favour of the Dependency Thesis.
Martin does not discuss this second route to the conclusion; and it is not clear whether
he would accept the subjectivity of egocentric orientations, or the argument exploiting it.
But even if not, it is still worthwhile to discuss both. When we see a building as being
to our left, it does not possess this orientation independently of being perceived by us as
having it. Certainly, the objective location of the building comes with the disposition of
giving rise to a perception of leftishness when viewed from a position to its North-West
by a normal human being with a normal orientation in objective space (e.g. standing on
his feet, etc.) who faces South. But its perceived property of being to our left cannot
simply be reduced to this objective disposition. Instead, the instantiation of this egocentric
orientation seems to depend on our actual perceptual awareness of it.
For one thing, which dispositional property is correlated to the property of being to the
left of us varies with changes in our location in objective space. Once we begin to move or
turn around, the building may very well cease to be to our left – though it may also begin to
be to the left of another person who steps in and takes our previous spot. The disposition
may therefore constitute the property of being to the left of whoever occupies the objec-
tively specified location to its North-West with the respective objectively specified orien-
tation. But it does not amount to the property of being to the left of us (understood in
first-personal terms). This is reflected in the more general fact that egocentric space
cannot be fully specified in objective terms – which is why the two are to be distinguished
in the first place. In particular, what we describe with the expression ‘to our left’ is not a
cardinal direction in objective space (Campbell 1995).23
Without this lack of strict correlation between egocentric and objective spatial features,
it would also seem impossible to explain why we cannot suffer an illusion with respect to
perceiving something as being to our actual left. Of course, when facing South, we may
perceive a building as being to our actual left while, in fact, it is located to the South-
West of our current location in objective space. But, as the previous considerations have
indicated, the objective orientational properties of the building are neither sufficient, nor
necessary for its instantiation of any subjective orientational property. What happens in
cases like this is just that we fail to track the former by perceiving the latter – an error
which is due to some breakdown in our relation to our environment.24
But the subjectivity of egocentric orientations has consequences for our attempts to
visualise objects as having them. Objects can possess these subjective features only
when they are perceived as having them. Furthermore, this is true as much of imagined
or other possible situations, as it is true of actual ones – assuming that they all contain
the same ontological kind of objects and properties. Finally, the dependence in question
does not range over different possible worlds, but is confined to a single one: the perceived
object and the perception are always part of the same world. Hence, visualising an object as
having such an experience-dependent property requires imagining a suitable perception of
that object. Visualising a building as being to the left, for instance, has to involve imagining
a perception of a building as being to the left.
4. Responding to intentionalist responses
It should now be easier to understand why some of the objections raised against Martin’s
considerations in support of thesis (ii) have in fact been missing their target. In many
cases, this is due to the fact that the critics have overlooked or underappreciated the impor-
tance of subjectivity in Martin’s line of thought. A good example for this is Tyler Burge’s
discussion of Martin’s argument for (ii). Burge seems to have no problem to accept that
visualising an object as being to the left requires the presence of a respective point of
view in the imagined situation. But he rejects the claim that there also has to be a perception
which occupies this location:
[Martin] begins by rightly noting that visualizing an object involves taking an imagined visual
perspective on the object – for example, visualizing it from a perspective according to which
the object is to the left. [. . .] Martin assumes that since the perspective is from some position in
the imagined scene, it must be the perspective of an imagined experience in the imagined scene,
or of an experience imagined to be in the imagined scene. This seems tantamount to begging
the question in an argument for the Dependency Thesis. (Burge 2005, 63ff.)
But it is not clear whether Burge’s charge really is one of begging the question. For he still
seems to briefly discuss – and dismiss – Martin’s argument involving the subjective per-
spectivalness of our presentation of orientational features. Here is how the first part of the
passage just quoted continues:
It is quite true that one could have such a perspective on the object only if one were to have an
experience of the object. It does not follow that if one imagines something from a perspective
that one could have only if such and such were the case (only if one were experiencing the
object from that perspective), then in imagining something from that perspective one must
imagine such and such to be the case. (Burge 2005, 63)
One problem with this passage is to understand the difference between ‘having a perspec-
tive on an object’ and ‘imagining something from that perspective’. That Burge takes the
two to be different becomes evident in his claim that only the first requires having a percep-
tual experience of the object. So what does ‘having such a perspective on an object’ mean?
If what is meant is simply visually presenting an object as being to the left, without further
specifying whether this presentation is perceptual or imaginative, then the intended contrast
collapses. For visualising an object to the left involves such a presentation, too. Further-
more, since Burge wants to deny that visualising requires imagining a perception, his
claim that ‘having such a perspective’ requires having a perceptual experience turns out
to be false. So this cannot be the right interpretation of his words. If, on the other hand,
what is meant by ‘having such a perspective’ is visually perceiving an object as being to
the left, then we get the desired contrast, given that visualising something does not
involve perceiving it. But then, the noted dependence claim becomes trivial and has
nothing to do with subjectivity. Perceiving an object as being to the left obviously requires
having a perception of it. And it does so independently of the subjective status of the per-
spectivalness or the perceived properties involved. So, if this reading is correct, Burge does
not really engage with Martin’s focus on the subjective element in our perceptions of ego-
centric orientations.
Something similar seems to happen in Paul Noordhof’s direct reply to Martin’s paper.25
For example, he acknowledges that the Dependency Thesis is plausible – if not true – in
the case of subjective properties. But he does not recognise that this is how the egocentric
properties figuring in Martin’s examples should probably be understood. Moreover, he
does not properly address the fact that what really matters in Martin’s main argument is
not the ontological status of the perceived properties, but instead that of our perspective
onto them.
This has, for instance, the result that he underestimates the resources of proponents of
the universal truth of the Dependency Thesis (among whom he seems to count Martin) for
explaining the apparent fact that we find this thesis more plausible in some cases than in
others:
As I have already noted, the Dependency Thesis varies in plausibility depending upon the
sensory modality we consider. It is more plausible when we consider what is involved in
imagining the feel of somebody’s skin or the taste of bacon. Our capacity to imagine
these things seems to rest upon our capacity to imagine our experiences of these things.
The proponent of the Dependency Thesis needs to explain why it is more plausible in
these cases given that the Dependency Thesis holds across the board. My guess is that
the proponent of the Dependency Thesis might try to argue that the variation in plausibility
depends upon contingent psychological facts about what we find easier to consider indepen-
dent of experience. The issue is whether we should search for an explanation there rather
than in the objects and properties imagined. If the feel of someone’s skin or the taste of
bacon imply the existence of corresponding perceptual experiences in contrast with other
objects of imagination, then the Dependency Thesis cannot be true for all sensory imagin-
ings. (Noordhof 2002, 446)
Here, Noordhof insists that the perceived difference in plausibility should be explained in
terms of a difference in the objects and properties imagined. His suggestion is that we find it
plausible with respect to certain things, but not others, to conceive of imagining them as an
instance of experiential imagination because we understand that they, but not the other
things, involve some experience-dependent element. So Noordhof, too, proposes a limit-
ation of the Dependency Thesis to cases pertaining to subjectivity. But he fails to acknowl-
edge that this is exactly Martin’s non-universalist take on the issue. Besides, Martin can
explain the difference between instances of imagining which require experiential imagin-
ation and instances which do not without having to refer to contingent facts about what
we find easy to conceive of as being experience-independent. For he can simply refer to
the involvement of subjective aspects of character – such as the perspectivalness involved
in the perception of egocentric orientation.
A very similar oversight becomes apparent in Noordhof’s discussion of the factors
which determine what is imagined when we are visualising something. Although he does
not draw this connection, it will be helpful to briefly consider the elements involved in
fixing what is part of the situation depicted by a painting. The marks on the surface (plus
perhaps our general recognitional abilities) determine whether the painting depicts a
blonde man or a brunette woman. But assuming that it is a blonde man, extra-pictorial
factors – such as the stipulation of a title or the exploitation of iconographic conventions
– decide whether it is a portrait of, say, Saint John or Hercules. The pictorial element puts
certain constraints on the extra-pictorial take on the nature of the depicted entities, which
cannot be overridden by the latter. An artist may turn his painting of a man into a portrait
of Jean of Arc by labelling it as such. But it will then be a painting of Jean of Arc in the
disguise of a man.
Noordhof’s observation is that very similar factors are responsible for determining the
nature of the objects of visualising. On the one hand, there is the basic visual presentation
and, on the other hand, the accompanying intentions or suppositions which put a certain
conceptual gloss on that visual presentation. To take an example from Peacocke (1985),
when we are visualising a suitcase, we may think of it as a suitcase with a cat hidden
behind it, or as a suitcase which is merely hallucinated by some brain in a vat. The
visual presentation is limited to the presentation of the suitcase, while the wider imaginative
project concerns also other aspects of the imagined situation. And again, how we conceive
of the visualised entities as part of such a project is constrained by how these entities are
visually given to us. We may use the visual presentation of the suitcase in order to
imagine a car, but only by imagining a car with the visual appearance of a suitcase.26
According to Noordhof, this constraint on what is imagined as part of the wider imagina-
tive project is problematic for a proponent of the Dependency Thesis. His starting point is the
idea that it is possible to pursue the project of imagining a certain object, and nothing else. The
subject engaged in this project conceives of it in terms of the object, but not in terms of any
experience of that object. Hence, if the project is also taken to involve imagining an experience
of the object, this cannot be due to any of the accompanying intentions or suppositions of the
subject. So a proponent of the Dependency Thesis has to assume that the imagining of the
experience is part of the visual presentation of the object. But this seems to violate the con-
straint of the visual presentation on the extra-visual interpretation of it. For we cannot
pursue the project of imagining nothing but an object by means of an episode of visualising
which involves imagining more than that object. The only way out appears to be to consider
the extra-visual gloss on the visual presentation to be irrelevant or, even worse, misleading:
When we consider what characterises an imaginative project, it is clear that there are cases
where the project is to imagine merely an F. Proponents of the Dependency Thesis don’t
have to resist this but, if they don’t, they must insist that certain facts about the mental
image override a subject’s own characterisation of his or her imaginative project so that, in
fact, what is imagined is a perceptual experience of an F. This is quite a strong claim to
have to establish. (Noordhof 2002, 430)
The questionable assumption in Noordhof’s line of reasoning, however, is that imagining an
object as having a certain feature is always distinct from, and more basic than, imagining
perceiving such an object. For this is not true if that feature is the egocentric orientation
of an object. Visualising such an orientation requires the involvement, but not the instantia-
tion, of a perception-dependent phenomenal aspect (e.g. that of leftishness); and what is
thereby visualised is, presumably, a subjective state of affairs. Imagining the instantiation
of an egocentric orientation therefore involves imagining a perception of that instantiation.
As a consequence, it is a misconception to think that it is possible to imagine ‘merely’ such
a feature, if this is meant to exclude imagining an experience of it. Notably, when we
describe an episode of ours simply as one of imagining an object as being to the left, our
characterisation is at best incomplete. It may refer to the episode of imagining a perception
of an object as being to the left. Or it may denote the episode of imagining an object as being
to the left of a specific perceiver – which has to include explicitly imagining that perceiving
subject in addition to the object. But contrary to what Noordhof suggests, there is no simpler
episode of imagining to be picked out by that description. Much the same response should
be given to Burge’s insistence that it is natural and not incoherent to say that we can visu-
alise something without imagining experiencing it:27
It seems to me that in a certain clear and natural sense, one can visualize an object and not
imagine visually experiencing the object. One imagines the object from the perspective of a
visual experience, but no experiencing of the object (either by oneself or by anyone else) is
imagined to be included in the imagined scene. [. . .] Prima facie, there seems to be nothing con-
tradictory in this claim, as there would be if (DT’) [i.e. (ii)] were (constitutively) true. (Burge
2005, 63)
Again, the problems start once we focus on visualising orientational features that locate
objects in egocentric space. Their imagination requires the imagination of a perceptual
perspective onto them. That it is still natural for us to say that what we are imagining is just
the object and its orientation may suggest that we either make use of an elliptical charac-
terisation, or have no full grasp of the nature of our episode of imagining and, in particular,
of the subjectivity involved in the perspectival presentation of egocentric orientations.
Indeed, it is to be expected that not all of our conceptions of subjective properties charac-
terise them as subjective. For example, we can discover that the phenomenal aspect of lef-
tishness and the property of being to our actual left are in fact experience-dependent. So we
should be able to conceive of those properties without conceiving of them as subjective. But
this means that we can engage in imagining without fully grasping what we are thereby
engaging in. In particular, we may imagine an instance of a specific egocentric orientation
without realising that we are thereby imagining a perception of it.
This helps to resolve another of Noordhof’s worries. Granting his opponent, for the sake
of argument, that imagining perceiving something constitutes sometimes the most basic
episode of imagining available to us, he still insists that it has to involve an – explicit or
implicit – thought which conceives of what one is imagining in terms of an experience.
But that visualising is therefore supposed to require the possession of the concept of an
experience casts doubt on whether, say, children under the age of four can visualise some-
thing, given that they may lack the notion of an experience.
If the Dependency Thesis rests on the claim that imaginers, at least tacitly, suppose that they are
imagining a perceptual experience, then it links the capacity to imagine with possession of the
concept of perceptual experience. In which case, the attribution of imaginings to the autistic,
young children, and animals, becomes as doubtful as their possession of the concept of percep-
tual experience. (Noordhof 2002, 436)
While acknowledging that the evidence seems undecided on this last issue, Noordhof is
right in pointing out that this connection to the empirical question of when children
acquire the concept of experience threatens to undermine the Dependency Thesis. For
not only does it seem empirically far less controversial whether young children can
visualise something than whether they can conceive of perceptions. But the issue of
when children become able to conceive of experiences should not be expected to have
such a strong bearing on the issue addressed by the Dependency Thesis – namely the
constitution (if not the concept) of imaginative experience.
These problems related to an over-intellectualisation of visualising arise, however, only if
theDependency Thesis indeed implies that imagining perceiving something requires the pos-
session or application of the concept of perception. Noordhof assumes that it does. But the
proponent of the Dependency Thesis need not – and should not – follow him in this. As
already noted, we need not fully grasp the nature of our imagining when being engaged in
it. And this includes the fact that it may involve imagining an experience. But, more impor-
tantly, this partial ignorance is possible because we imagine an experience, not by thinking of
it as part of the imagined situation, but by experientially imagining the instantiation of its
character. That is, imagining an experience is a form of object awareness, and not of thinking.
What the Dependence Thesis – in the form of thesis (ii) – claims is that the visual presen-
tation involved in relevant cases of visualising consists in the experiential presentation of
the character of a visual perception. And this kind of object awareness does not involve
the employment of the concept of a visual perception.At best, it relies on somediscriminatory
or recognitional capacities with respect to experiences, as well as perhaps some basic demon-
strative ways of referring to the respective experiences as ‘this’ or ‘that’. It is of course still
possible for us to add some additional thoughts to our episode of experiential imagination.
For instance, we can take the imagined experience to be a hallucination, or one of the
perceptions that Napoleon had when looking at the battle of Jena. But the basic form of ima-
gining a perception does not involve such conceptualisations, but instead constrains them.
The final intentionalist criticism that I would like to address is the charge that under-
standing visualising in terms of imagining and perceiving raises more questions than that
it answers. It is worthwhile to note that, if this charge is adequate, it poses a general diffi-
culty for all views, assuming that the argument concerning the visualisation of egocentric
orientations goes through. But it is true that more needs to be said about the nature of
experiential imagination and, in particular, how it can accommodate certain important
features of visualising – notably its involvement of a visual, perspectival and non-
neutral presentation of external things. Part of this explanatory challenge can be restated
by the distinction between the exemplification and the representation of a subjective
aspect of character. Episodes of seeing exemplify a perceptual character, while episodes
of visualising – if they amount to experiential imagination – involve the imaginative rep-
resentation of such a character. What then needs explaining is how the proposed kind of
representation can ensure that the character of representing (i.e. that of visualising) is
very similar to the represented character (i.e. that of seeing) in the mentioned respects
(i.e. visual presentation, perspectivalness and non-neutrality), without being identical to it.
In addition to the problems just mentioned, there is obscurity in the explanation provided by the
Dependency Thesis. It rests upon the idea that the experience is represented in imagination. But
it is unclear how to cash this out. [. . .] It is hard not to think that all the explanatory work
is being done by the nature of imagination and the kind of representation which serves it.
(Noordhof 2002, 447)
Noordhof is absolutely right about the last point. But the proposed kind of representation is
perhaps less mysterious than it might seem to him and others. Consider the reproduction of
a painting – for instance, a postcard hanging at your wall. This image does not itself amount
to a painting and differs substantially from one (e.g. it does not involve paint and has no
perceivable texture). But it nonetheless inherits important aspects of the reproduced paint-
ing. Most of all, it depicts the same objects and features, and from the same perspective, as
the painting. Indeed, if the reproduction is done well, its perspectivalness derives from that
of the reproduced painting, and not from the perspectivalness of the photographic process
involved in the reproduction. That is, the impact of the point of view occupied by the lens
directed at the painting is typically negligible in comparison with the impact of the point of
view inherent to the photographed depiction.28 Much more can surely be said about how the
reproduction does end up presenting the same situation from the same perspective as the
painting. But the absence of such further elucidations does not render the kind of represen-
tation involved in photographic reproduction mysterious or completely unilluminating. We
accept that this kind of representation exists. And the description given above gives us some
grasp of what it amounts to. In fact, we know at least that the reproduction represents the
painting partly by representing the visual perspective of the painting; and that it represents
the latter’s perspective by presenting the same objects and features as they are presented to
the point of view of the painting.
Imagining a perception involves the same kind of representation. It represents a percep-
tion partly by representing the latter’s perspective. And it does this by presenting the same
external objects and features as they are presented to the point of view of such a perception.
In imagining a perception, we thus imagine a possible perceptual perspective onto the
world.29 And, as in the case of the reproduction of a painting, the resulting episode of visua-
lising ends up with a character very similar in its visual, perspectival and non-neutral char-
acter to that of an episode of seeing. Besides, we also know that this imaginative
representation of a perceptual perspective constitutes an experiential form of object aware-
ness, which may be spelled out in intentional terms – an idea which, incidentally, disjunc-
tivists agree with. Although it leaves many issues open, this characterisation of what
experiential imagining amounts to, and how it can inherit some of the features of the ima-
gined experiences, should be illuminating enough to rebut the charge of obscurity. The pro-
posed kind of representation is involved in other phenomena as well. And we have some
understanding of how it can explain the presence of the important features of reproductions
and episodes of visualising noted.
To illustrate that explanatory power, it is worthwhile to have a brief look at how this
account of experiential imagination can answer a challenge raised by Currie and Raven-
scroft (2003, 28).30 They ask for an account of why it is possible that we may mistake
an instance of seeing for an instance of visualising (e.g. as in Perky’s experiments), and
that we may recall something as seen that we have merely visualised in the past (e.g. as
in the case of fabricated memories). Their suspicion is that the defenders of the Dependency
Thesis do not have the resources to identify the underlying similarities, assuming that they
have to accept a difference between what we see and what we visualise as part of the
respective experiences.
How could we explain, on this hypothesis, why people are prone to misrecall visualizing as
seeing, and in some circumstances will mistake perception for visualization? According to
the hypothesis, visualizing an F has the representational content, not F, but seeing an F.
Thus the seeing and visualizing have quite different contents. Why would states with such
different contents seem to us to be so similar? Content is just one dimension of similarity;
perhaps states could differ in content and be similar in other ways. But the hypothesis offers
us no account of what these other similarities might be and how they could, in the face of
content-dissimilarity, sustain the overall phenomenological similarity that seeing and visualiz-
ing enjoy. (Currie and Ravenscroft 2003, 28)
One part of the answer to this challenge is to stress that, for a proponent of the Dependency
Thesis, there is – contrary to what Currie and Ravenscroft suggest – a substantial overlap
in content between seeing and visualising. For imagining a perception of an external object
involves the visual presentation of that object as part of the imagined situation – just as the
reproduction depicts whatever is depicted by the reproduced painting. In other words,
experiential imagination has two objects: the imagined experience and the external thing
presented by the latter. We have already seen how disjunctivism can accommodate this
fact by taking the imagination of a perception to consist in the imagination of the instantia-
tion of a relational character with two relata. I will address the issue of how experiential
intentionalism can allow for more than one object of experiential imagination at the end
of the next and final section of this paper. The other part of the reply to Currie’s and
Ravenscroft’s challenge is that, as already illustrated by reference to the analogy with the
reproduction of paintings, the presentation of external things involved in imaginatively
adopting the subjective perspective of a perception shares many important aspects with
the presentation of those things involved in perceiving them from such a perspective.
Accordingly, seeing and imagining seeing resemble each other, not only in what they
make us aware of, but also in how they present it to us.
5. Meeting the challenge for intentionalism
There are good reasons to accept the first two members of the inconsistent triad introduced
at the beginning. So why should – and typically do – intentionalists accept the third? What
forces them to assume that imagining a visual perception of an external thing is neutral
about the latter’s presence in the imagined situation? To answer this question, it will actu-
ally be helpful to have a look at why disjunctivists reject this thesis.
What we are concerned with are cases in which we visualise an external object by ima-
gining a perception of it. And we imagine a perception by experientially imagining the
instantiation of the character of a perception. According to disjunctivism, the character
of a perception – and therefore the perception itself – is partly constituted by the perceived
object. So what we are doing when we are imagining a perception is that we are imagining a
relational character. And this involves imagining the two relata: a subjective perspective
and the external things and features presented to that perspective.31 In other words, by
experientially imagining a perception, we imagine all its experiential constituents –
which include the perceived object, since the latter constitutes part of the character of the
perception. So, in some sense, such instances of experiential imagination take two
objects: the perception and the perceived object. But since the former is relational in char-
acter by containing the latter, we in fact imagine a single, but complex object, namely the
perception.
This account can easily explain the transparency and non-neutrality of visualising.
Visualising consists, partly, of the representation of external things and their features,
given that it consists of the representation of a character constituted by those entities.
And in line with the intentionalist nature of that representation, the character of visualising
is partly determined by what it represents. Hence, when we reflect on the character of an
episode of visualising, we are bound to find the represented objects and features as part
of what is visualised. Moreover, we do not find any other candidate objects of awareness.
There are no internal pictures or similar entities involved in visualising. And the subjective
perspective, which constitutes the imagined perception as its second relatum, is not given as
an object of awareness, but rather as part of the subject of awareness. This means, of course,
that introspection reveals not only what we are aware of, but also the way in which we are
aware of it. So a strong representationalist interpretation of transparency and the character
of visual experience (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995; Speaks 2009) is not compatible with the
resulting picture. But strong representationalism is undermined, in any case, by the fact
that seeing and visualising can have the same external things and features as objects, so
that their difference in character has to be due to some other element, namely the kind of
object awareness involved.
The intentionalist treatment of imagining perceiving differs from the one just presented
because intentionalism does not assume that the perceived object constitutes the character
of the perception. But, as Martin has noted, this fact gives rise to a problem (Martin 2003,
sect. 4). Both parties in the debate agree that, when we are imagining an object, we are non-
neutral about the presence in the imagined situation of what we are imagining. Hence, in
imagining a perception, we are committed to the presence of a perception – or, more
specifically, the instantiation of a perceptual character – in the imagined world.
However, according to intentionalism, the presence of a perception does not entail the pres-
ence of a perceived object. For perception is, from an experiential point of view, an experi-
ence of exactly the same kind as a hallucination: they both possess the same intentional
character. But this means that there is no difference between imagining a perception and
imagining a hallucination. In both cases, we imagine the same perceptual character. And
since the instantiation of this character does not involve any external things, we imagine
it without imagining such things. However, if we do not imagine an external thing as
part of imagining a perception, there is no reason to assume that the latter is non-neutral
about the presence of an external thing in the imagined situation. After all, this kind of
non-neutrality comes with imagining something and seems to extend just to what is ima-
gined. This argument of Martin may be summarised as follows (see especially Martin
(2003, 415ff.)):
(iii.1) Imagining an object is non-neutral about the presence of that object – including its con-
stitutive parts – in the imagined situation; and about no other object’s presence.
(iii.2) The object of awareness in the case of imagining a perception of an external thing is the
perception.
(iii.3) Perceptions do not involve any external things as constituents.
(iii) Hence, imagining a perception of an external thing is neutral about the latter’s presence in
the imagined situation.
The disjunctivist can block this argument by rejecting (iii.3), but it is far less obvious how
the intentionalist could avoid having to accept its conclusion. The premisses (iii.1) and
(iii.3) seem to be simply part of the intentionalist outlook on things. That perceiving is
intentional just means that it does not involve the perceived object as its element. And,
more generally, intentional presentations are committal insofar as they involve a respective
attitude towards the presented. Accordingly, the non-neutrality of imagining should extend
just to what is imagined. Premiss (iii.2), on the other hand, simply states a definitional truth
about part of what the imaginative object awareness of a perception amounts to. However, if
the intentionalists have to accept (iii), they have to reject (i) or (ii). And, as the previous
sections were meant to show, neither is a feasible option. So what has to go, it seems, is
intentionalism itself – and at least (iii.3) with it.
It does not help to highlight the fact that, according to intentionalism, imagining a per-
ception involves imagining a commitment towards the presence of an external thing in the
imagined world. As described in the first section, intentionalists claim that perceptions
involve an intentional attitude towards their objects which takes the latter to be present
in the situation before the perceiving subject. In the case of an imagined perception, this
non-neutrality concerns of course the presence of the object in the imagined world,
which also contains that perception and the related imagined subjective perspective. Ima-
gining a perception therefore involves imagining taking an external thing to be part of
the respective situation. But imagining such a commitment is compatible with actually
staying neutral on the issue. Hence, this aspect of experiential imagination does not
suffice to establish the non-neutrality of actual instances of visualising (cf. Martin 2003,
415).
Now, that intentionalists indeed endorse the problematic claim (iii), and roughly for the
reasons sketched, may be illustrated by reference to Burge’s discussion of Martin’s paper.
Once it is assumed that it is sometimes possible (if not even necessary) to visualise an object
by imagining perceiving it – an assumption which he is happy to grant – Burge seems to
have no problem with any of the three premisses needed to derive thesis (iii).32 In particular,
he is clear about the fact that the intentionalist view takes perceptions not to involve their
objects (cf. (iii.3)). And he also assumes that imagining a perception does not itself involve
imagining an external thing to be present in the imagined situation (cf. (iii.1) and its discus-
sion in the second section). Instead, this presence is merely supposed as part of a thought
accompanying or even preceding the imagining of the perceptual experience. Burge’s com-
plaint is, in fact, that Martin is wrong in demanding that the commitment about the presence
of the visualised object in the imagined situation should be part of the experiential
imagination.
The ‘intentional theory’ is not required to explain how by merely imagining an experience with
a certain representational content one thereby supposes that the content is veridical. I deny that
this supposed explanandum is even true. In the imagined experience which, according to the
Dependency Thesis, is involved in visualizing, one does not take the representational
content of the imagined experience itself to involve or entail the presence of the visualized
object. Rather one has begun with the supposition of veridicality. One simply takes the
content of the imagined experience to be veridical. The content itself might not have been ver-
idical. That is the position of the ‘intentionalist theory’. Certainly, it is my position. (Burge
2005, 65)
As discussed in the second section, what Burge is rejecting here is thesis (i). But he is
happy, as an intentionalist, to embrace thesis (iii) – and thereby opens up his position to
Martin’s criticism. For the non-neutrality involved in visualising cannot simply be
moved from the episode of visualising to the additional supposition. The transparency
and non-neutrality of visualising are aspects of the kind of object awareness involved in
visualising (cf. claim (i)). And this kind of object awareness is, according to the Depen-
dency Thesis, identical with an instance of experientially imagining a perception (cf.
(ii)). Hence, it is already part of the experiential imagination that an external thing is
given as part of the imagined situation. And, together with thesis (iii), this leads to an incon-
sistent position.
However, as I would like to suggest in the remainder of this paper, intentionalism need
not endorse thesis (iii) and thus may answer the challenge put forward in Martin’s paper.
The key thought is that intentionalists need not endorse premiss (iii.1) in its current
form. They should agree that imagining something is non-neutral towards what is imagined.
But they should also point out that there are other ways in which imagining – or at least
imagining a perception – can be committal. A closer look at the intentionalist understand-
ing of the commitment involved in visual experience will show how this is possible.
According to intentionalism, the commitment to the presence of some visually per-
ceived or imagined object in the respective situation is compatible with there being no
such object. For instance, when we hallucinate a green tree, we are non-neutral about the
existence of a green tree in our actual environment, despite there being no such tree
there before us. The committal aspect of perceptual experiences is therefore independent
of the presence or absence of a perceived object.33
The same is true of the non-neutrality involved in visualising. It is plausible to maintain
that, as the default case (i.e. in the absence of intentions or suppositions to the opposite
effect), visualising an object suffices for the presence of that object in the imagined
world. After all, specific imagined situations are populated by those possible (and
perhaps impossible) entities which we imagine to be part of them. But this is a fact
about the nature of imagined worlds, and not about the nature of imaginative commitment.
The principle at work here is something like that imagined worlds are such that they contain
whichever entities our imaginings are non-neutral about. This principle assumes that ima-
ginings are committal, but it does not exploit any aspect of the nature of that commitment.
That is, its truth does not depend on what it means for imaginative experiences or thoughts
to be non-neutral. Hence, nothing speaks against this non-neutrality being independent of
the presence or absence of an imagined object.
This object-independence, however, leaves room for the possibility of an imaginative
commitment which is not due to the constitution of the imagined perception by its
object. But what else could be the source for such a commitment? The answer can –
perhaps a bit surprisingly – in fact be found in the disjunctivist rejection of premiss
(iii.3). One factor that is central in this rebuttal is that disjunctivism distinguishes sharply
between imagining a perception and imagining a perception-like hallucination. They are
two different imaginative projects. Imagining a perception consists of imagining the instan-
tiation of a perceptual character. The problem with imagining a hallucination is that, accord-
ing to disjunctivism, we do not know anything positive about the character of such an
experience. We know merely that its character is subjectively indistinguishable from that
of a perception. Hence, the only way for us to imagine a hallucination is to imagine the
instantiation of a perceptual character and then simply to stipulate that the resulting ima-
gined experience is a hallucination which only seems to exemplify a perceptual character,
but in fact exemplifies a character which is indistinguishable from a perceptual one.
One thing that is very important to note about this is that the two imaginative projects do
not differ in which character is imagined as being instantiated. They differ only in that one is
the most basic – or default – case of imagining a perceptual experience, while the other
requires some additional suppositions. The other thing not to be missed is that this
already suffices to ensure that imagining a perception is non-neutral about the presence
of an external thing in the imagined situation – reference to the constitution of perceptions
is not needed. That imagining a perception is the default case when we are trying to imagine
a perceptual experience means, among other things, that imagining a hallucination requires
explicitly denouncing the perceptual status of the imagined experience. But this is possible
only if imagining a perception is non-neutral about its being a perception (whatever that
means for its constitution). Hence, visualising an external thing – that is, imagining a per-
ception of such a thing – comes, by default, with a commitment to the presence of a visual
perception (rather than a hallucination) in the imagined situation. But perceptions differ
from hallucinations in being factive (again, independently of the constitution of either).
Accordingly, the presence of a perception implies the presence of a perceived object. So
the commitment involved in visualising extends to the presence of an external thing in
the imagined world. And its double source is the factivity of perceptions and the default
status of imagining a perception.
What is crucial now is that an intentionalist can adopt more or less the same account of
the two different projects. The only difference is that the character to be imagined in both
imaginative projects counts as perceptual for a different reason. Disjunctivism maintains
that this character is perceptual because only perceptions, but not hallucinations, possess
it. By contrast, intentionalists accept that this character is shared by perceptions and percep-
tion-like hallucinations. Nonetheless, intentionalists can still count it as perceptual, and not
as hallucinatory, because it is characteristic of perceptions, and not of hallucinations. This
has the consequence that imagining the instantiation of this character amounts, by default,
to imagining a perception (rather than a hallucination). Nothing more is needed, especially
no intention or thought concerning the perceptual status of the imagined experience.
Imagining a hallucination, on the other hand, involves not only the experiential imagination
of that character, but also a supposition to the effect that the imagined experience is
hallucinatory, despite first appearances. The rest of the intentionalist story is the same as
the disjunctivist one. That imagining a perception is the default case means, partly, that
imagining the character in question comes with a commitment to the presence of a percep-
tion in the imagined situation. And this non-neutrality extends again to the visualised
external things and features because of the factivity of perception.
(and related) element is that the character in question involves a self-reflexive form of inten-
tionality which is concerned with the presentation of the respective experiences as
perceptions (and not as hallucinations). As already noted in the first section, perceptions
and first-personally indistinguishable hallucinations differ in their third-personally
accessible structure which may or may not relate them to the world. The thought is now
that it is part of their common intentionality that perceptions and hallucinations present
not only the world, but also themselves as being a certain way. More specifically, both
kinds of perceptual experience present themselves as relating us to external things in the
manner distinctive of perceptions. This presentational aspect forms part of their shared char-
acter. But only perceptions do actually relate us in the relevant way to external things and
therefore present themselves adequately. By contrast, hallucinations are not relational and
thus mislead us about their own third-personal structure (Dorsch 2010a; Dorsch and Soldati
forthcoming). The character of perceptual experiences is thus characteristic of perceptions,
and not hallucinations, because it subjectively marks both of them as perceptions, and not
hallucinations. Their shared character is characteristic of perceptions, and not hallucina-
tions, because it adequately reflects the structure of the former, but not of the latter.
The character of perceptual experiences is not unlike the appearance of real and fake
lemons. The latter two are (ideally) visually indistinguishable because they share the
same appearance. But this appearance is characteristic of real lemons, and not of fake
lemons. When we see an object with that appearance, we take it, by default, to be a real
lemon. And visualising an object with that appearance amounts, by default, to visualising
a real lemon. In this case, the priority of real lemons over fake lemons is, of course,
grounded in very different factors – such as their value for us, their natural or artificial
status or perhaps even their sheer number. But the basic phenomenon is the same: we
have some form of object awareness (experiential vs. visual), and the respective presenta-
tional element or appearance is, by default, non-neutral about what is presented. Besides, in
both cases, the difference between the default experience and its non-default counterpart is
that the latter involves an additional thought concerned with the further specification or
re-characterisation of what is presented. We do not, say, first see an object with a lemon-
like appearance and then judge it to be that of a real lemon, rather than a fake one; we
simply see a lemon. Similarly, imagining the instantiation of a character characteristic of
a perception suffices to count as imagining a perception; no additional stipulation that
the imagined experience is a perception, and not a hallucination, is needed.
It still has been left open, of course, why – and in which sense – the character shared by
perceptions and some hallucinations is characteristic of the former, but not of the latter. One
aspect of this is that being a perception implies having this character, while being a hallu-
cination does not. For not all hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from percep-
tions and therefore do not share the same character (Dorsch 2010b). But the more important
intentionalism would account for the difference between imagining a perception and ima-
gining a hallucination – which obtains despite both projects involving imagining the instan-
tiation of one and the same character – partly in terms of a difference in nature in what is 
imagined. But either way is fine: experiential intentionalism is compatible with structural 
disjunctivism, but does not require it.35
6. An objection to disjunctivism
There are independent reasons for preferring the intentionalism put forward here over its
intentionalist rivals – and, indeed, over disjunctivism. For instance, the proposed view
promises to be able to capture both externalist and internalist epistemological ideas: it
can identify the third-personal, relational structure of perceptions as their knowledge-
relevant and reason-giving features, while also ensuring some first-personal, experiential
access to them which does not suffer the problem over-intellectualisation (Dorsch 2010a;
Dorsch and Soldati forthcoming). Here is, however, not the space to elaborate on this
and other advantages of the view; or to discuss how it may respond to some of the other
challenges directed at intentionalism (e.g. those raised in Martin (2004)). Instead, I
would like, in closing, to formulate an objection to the disjunctivist account of the transpar-
ency and non-neutrality of visualising.
Disjunctivism has objected to intentionalism that the latter cannot properly account for
the commitment involved in experientially imagining a perception. In the preceding section,
I have argued that this objection can be met by intentionalism in the form of experiential
intentionalism. My contention now is that disjunctivism cannot properly account for the
commitment involved in experientially imagining a hallucination. Disjunctivism assumes
that we experientially imagine a perception-like hallucination by experientially imagining
the instantiation of a perceptual character and by additionally supposing that what is indeed
is imagined is an experience which possesses a different, but subjectively indistinguishable
character.
[W]hen one takes on the project of sensorily imagining visual hallucination as opposed to
visual perception, what one has to do is imagine the situation as for the perceptual situation.
One’s appreciation of its hallucinatory status will not come from some phenomenologically dis-
tinctive element of what one has imagined, but rather the further cognitive gloss one puts on it
all. That is, when one sensorily imagines a visual hallucination, one puts oneself in a position
where one takes the imagined situation to contain the objects presented, and then uses that
image as the basis of imagining a situation just like it in which it appears to one as if there
is such an object, although none is present. (Martin 2003, 417)
The proposed version of intentionalism – experiential intentionalism – departs signifi-
cantly from those which are currently more orthodox (see footnote 2 for references). In
particular, it differs from them in agreeing with disjunctivism that the priority of perceptions
over perceptual-like hallucinations is not exhausted by the fact that both kinds of perceptual
experience involve a perceptual attitude, that is, take their objects to actually exist and to be
as they present them as being. It is also said to include the fact that hallucinations possess a
perceptual character and present themselves as perceptions; and not vice versa. As a result,
hallucinations and their features (e.g. their motivational and rational powers) have to be
elucidated in terms of perceptions and their characteristic character; while the latter can
be discussed without any reference to hallucinations.34 The claim that the self-presenta-
tional character of perceptual experiences adequately reflects the structure of perceptions
and therefore counts as characteristic of perceptions may perhaps require the assumption
that the underlying structural difference between seeing and hallucinating is one in
nature. That is, experiential intentionalism should perhaps be combined with structural
disjunctivism (as defined in the first section). This would, for instance, be more in line
with phenomenal disjunctivism insofar as then both this view and experiential
This means, however, that we continue to imagine a perception and thus have not really
succeeded in imagining a hallucination. But it is surely possible for us to succeed in
pursuing the latter project.
So the answer to the question has to be no: the experiential imagination of the percep-
tion does not any more determine that the imagined situation contains an external thing. But
this has the consequence that it also cannot any more determine that this situation contains a
perceptual experience. It cannot posit a perception as part of the imagined world because
this would, after all, require positing an external thing. And it cannot posit a hallucination
because this would require imagining the character of hallucination, and not that of a per-
ception. Hence, the experiential imagination stops altogether to determine what the ima-
gined world contains, once the supposition is added. And the hallucination is therefore
only intellectually imagined to be part of the imagined situation, but not experientially.
Again, we have failed in our project, which was to experientially imagine a hallucination.
In short, disjunctivism entails the impossibility of experientially imagining a perception-
like hallucination. The underlying reason for this is, of course, that disjunctivists should
deny that we have any access to the positive nature of the character of such a hallucination
(Martin 2004; Dorsch 2010a). We merely know that it is indistinguishable from the char-
acter of a perception. But this knowledge does not suffice to imagine the instantiation of
the character of a perception-like hallucination. The difficulty with this is that we seem
nonetheless to be able to experientially imagine having such a hallucination. The disjunc-
tivist cannot account for this possibility.
Experiential intentionalism, as well as other versions of intentionalism, do not face the
same problem. The character of a perception-like hallucination is, after all, identical with
that of a perception. And we can experientially imagine its instantiation because we have
positive knowledge of its nature – especially its intentional nature. The same is true of
visualising fake lemons. We know positively what they look like, namely that they have
the same appearance as real lemons. And we can therefore visualise them, even if this
requires some additional stipulation that we are not confronted with the default case.
This cancelling out is not problematic in the case of imagining a hallucination, since the
experiential imagination of the respective character can loose its power to ensure the pres-
ence of an external thing, without loosing its power to ensure the presence of a perceptual
experience. For no constitutive link is assumed to hold between the character of perceptions
and their objects.
The main problem with this proposal is that the presence in the imagined situation of an 
external thing, which is a consequence of the presence of the imagined relational percep-
tion, cannot be properly cancelled out by the additional supposition that there is no such 
thing present in the imagined situation, after all. As a result, it – wrongly – turns out to 
be impossible to experientially imagine a perception-like hallucination. For the disjuncti-
vist, a perception and its character is constituted by its object; and imagining the former 
involves imagining the latter. Hence, imagining a perceptual character includes imagining 
a perceived object as part of the imagined world. Now, once the suggested supposition is 
added, the question arises of whether this basic episode of experiential imagination still 
suffices for the presence of the external object in the imagined situation. If the answer is 
yes – and assuming that the presence of this object is a determinate matter – the opposing 
supposition can, in this respect, have no impact on what the imagined world contains.
That the two objects are given to us in a different way is also apparent in the fact that we are
aware of one of them (i.e. the external thing) solely by being aware of the other (i.e. the
perception of it). This is also exactly what happens in the case of a reproduction of a paint-
ing: the former represents what the latter depicts by representing the latter. And in the case
of both experiential imagination and the reproduction of an artwork, what is represented –
the character of a perception and a painting, respectively – is not relational, that is, not con-
stituted by the objects that they themselves present. This doubling of objects does not
undermine the transparency of visualising or, more generally, experiential imagination.
For while the imagined experiences are objects of awareness, they are not given to us as
objects of awareness. Instead, we are aware of them by imaginatively adopting the subjec-
tive perspective inherent to them. Nonetheless, they still count as genuine objects of aware-
ness because our episodes of experiential imagination are non-neutral about their presence
in the imagined world.
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Notes
1. See, especially Martin (2003, 417ff.). McDowell (1998) and Fish (2009) defend versions of dis-
junctivism, which – in many relevant respects – come close to that defended by Martin and
discussed here.
2. See Dorsch (2010a), as well as Dorsch and Soldati (forthcoming), for more detailed discussions
of these differences. Among the current proponents of intentionalism, which have written expli-
citly on visualising and experiential imagination, are Hopkins (1998), Noordhof (2002), Currie
and Ravenscroft (2003) and Burge (2005). Others are Dretske (1995), Tye (1995) and Speaks
(2009).
It seems therefore better to give up this constitutive claim – and thus disjunctivism –
and to locate the source of the transparency and non-neutrality of both seeing and visualis-
ing in the factivity of perceptions and their priority over hallucinations. Does this mean that
visualising an external thing – in cases where it is identical with imagining a perception –
does not really involve visually imagining such a thing? Is the imagined perception the only
object of the experiential imagination potentially involved in visualising? The answer
should, of course, be no: visualising an external thing makes us visually aware of it and
is not neutral towards its presence in the imagined situation. This is possible because experi-
ential imagination takes two objects. These objects are of different kinds (experiences vs.
external things). They are presented in different ways (experientially or phenomenally vs.
visually, auditorily, etc.). And they may or may not be independent of each other (e.g. in
the case of an imagined pain, they are not). So what intentionalists should do is to add a
clause about the other object of experiential imagination to premiss (iii.2):
(iii.2∗) The objects of awareness in the case of imagining a perception of an external thing are
the perception and the external thing.
7. This difference is sometimes also spelled out in terms of perceptions ‘acquaintaining’ us with
things, or making them ‘manifest’ to us (though intentionalists can presumably adopt at least
the first manner of talking). Besides, it can be ignored here what disjunctivists do, or should,
say about hallucinations and their subjective indistinguishability from perceptions. It is
perhaps defensible to argue that they still make us intentionally aware of objects (Smith
2002). But it seems more natural for disjunctivism to conclude that hallucinations do not
make us aware of objects at all – they just seem to do so.
8. Indeed, it may very well be that the transparency at issue is, in fact, inseparably linked to the
presentation of objects, rather than the entertainment of propositions. When introspecting
experiences, the external things that we find are shown to us; and no internal objects are
given to us in this way. The issue of whether a given thought is transparent in this sense
does not arise then, since thinking is not an instance of object awareness.
9. Martin (2003, 37 and 39) mentions the example of mentally rotating a piece of furniture in a
shop in order to see whether it is possible to get it through one’s front door at home.
10. The claim may become trivial, if it can be established that object awareness is, by its very pre-
sentational nature, transparent and commital (see footnote 8). But to establish this is not a trivial
task.
11. Note that Martin uses ‘experience’ here as short for ‘sense experience’, such as perception or
bodily sensation. As already mentioned, my own use is less narrow in also including, say, visua-
lising or other imaginative instances of object awareness.
12. A further possible locus of misunderstanding is perhaps that (ii) understands both visualising
and imagining a perception as instances of object awareness, given that some intentionalists
tend to construe visual experience in terms of thought-like contents (see, for instance,
Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995)).
13. It is true, though, that others – such as Peacocke (1985) and O’Shaughnessy (2003) – have put
forward stronger versions of the claim, extending even to all kinds of sensory imagining. And
Martin is clearly sympathetic with this more general conclusion, as can be witnessed in Martin
(2003, 404ff.) and Martin (2001).
14. See section 3 inMartin (2003), which is mostly occupied with the development of his argument in
favour of thesis (ii), the restricted version of the Dependency Thesis. In what follows, I draw
heavily on this section of Martin’s paper. I am also very grateful to the challenging questions
about this section raised by Marcus Willaschek, which helped me greatly to get clearer about
certain details ofMartin’s argument, aswell as aboutmyownaddition to it at the endof this section.
3. I use the term ‘experience’ to denote not only sense experiences, but all instances of conscious
object awareness, including episodes of visualising and of experiential imagination. The
expression ‘perceptual experience’ is meant to cover both (veridical) perceptions and hallucina-
tions, and I distinguish between the latter two independently of whether they differ in nature or
not. Besides, when I speak of ‘hallucinations’, I mean to refer, if not stated otherwise, to percep-
tion-like hallucinations – that is, hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from
perceptions (Dorsch 2010a).
4. See Martin’s distinction between the semantic and the stative conception of representation in
Martin (2003).
5. The resulting characterisation of intentionalism is meant to be neutral between its various
versions, including both naturalistic and non-naturalistic conceptions of its nature. That is,
the first-personal presentational and attitudinal aspects of perceptions may – but need not be
– further elucidated in terms of mental representation and functional role. In Dorsch and
Soldati (forthcoming), we argue that at least reference to representation is not very helpful,
since it ignores the essential connection between intentionality and consciousness or subjectiv-
ity. A similar issue with functional role is whether it is the same as rational role, or whether it is
non-normative in nature. If the latter, we again contend that intentionality cannot be separated
from normativity.
6. This conclusion is not necessitated, since perceptions and hallucinations might possibly differ in
aspects of character that are not linked to how they make us aware of objects and features. But it
is not clear what aspects that could be, or why it should be plausible to assume their existence.
20. Of course, Martin cannot assume in his argument that an experience’s instantiation of the aspect
of leftishness is also sufficient for the existence of something to our actual left. This would
follow only if the experience is a perception, and if perceptions are always factive – something
that intentionalists deny.
21. There is also the issue of whether visualising always locates objects relative to us, rather than to
some imagined subject. The default case seems to be that we visualise objects as orientated
towards ourselves, and that imaginative projects involving subjects different from us require
the additional identification of our imagined point of view with that of those other subjects
(Wollheim 1984; Martin 2003, 411).
22. The possibility of experiencing a phantom limbs as hurting is no exception. The only difference
is that, in this case, the existence of the hurting body part is subjective as well. But, in any case,
nothing here depends on whether the presented view on pains and pain experiences is correct.
The analogy is merely meant to further illustrate Martin’s treatment of the involvement of
subjective elements in imaginative experience.
23. Compare also the famous example of two incongruent hands with different orientations in Kant
(1992).
24. The property of being to our left shares both discussed aspects with the property of being here if
ascribed to ourselves. The latter, too, cannot be specified in purely objective terms. And we
cannot go wrong in being aware of ourselves as being here. One difference between our aware-
ness of us as being here and our awareness of other objects as being to our left is, however, that
the latter may concern hallucinated objects. This is not problematic for the present argument
since it relies only on the claim that the instantiation of egocentric orientations requires the
occurrence of a perception of them, but not on the reverse claim. Besides, as already suggested
in note 22, there are perhaps other ways of reconciling the subjectivity of a property with the
possibility of hallucinating an instance of it.
15. It does not really matter for Martin’s main argument whether we are concerned here with two
different sets of spatial properties of objects (e.g. one objective, and the other subjective), or
instead with two modes of presentation of one and the same set. What is relevant here is primar-
ily the fact that our perceptual access to spatially located objects is perspectival and, in particu-
lar, presents them as orientated towards us, rather than in more objective terms. But many of the
points involved in the argument can be described more easily by reference to egocentric prop-
erties. Besides, the postulation of subjective orientations is not much different from the postula-
tion of subjective modes of presentation (cf. the similar issue raised below with respect to the
aspect of leftishness and similar phenomenal aspects).
16. In what follows, I concentrate on the fact that perceptions present objects in actual space and
mention the temporal dimension only when it becomes relevant.
17. It should become clear very shortly that there is a third possibility: the experience may represent
another experience as instantiating or presenting the quality.
18. Using the expression ‘being to the left’ to denote a monadic property is not ideal, since this
expression clearly has some connotations of relationality. But it is not easy to come up with
another formulation, without altogether loosing the connection to the perceived property of
being to our actual left. I am grateful to Marcus Willaschek for making me aware of this issue.
19. Very similar issues arise, for instance, with respect to the status of the quality of ovalness –
another perspectival aspect of perception – which figures in our experience when we are
looking at objects from an angle and perceive them as round. Again, we typically draw
round objects by tracing elliptical shapes on the canvas. But it is debatable whether our experi-
ences present round objects as elliptical in addition to presenting them as round (see, for
instance, Peacocke’s (1983) discussion of what he calls sensational properties). One significant
difference from egocentric orientation is, however, that, while roundness is an objective prop-
erty, being to the left of us is not.
34.
35.
But see the end of Dorsch (2010a) for a line of reasoning which supports the supplementation of 
experiential intentionalism with structural disjunctivism.
See Martin (2003, 2004) and Dorsch (2010a). Similar ideas can be found in the intentionalist 
views inspired by the phenomenological tradition, such as that put forward in Smith (2002). 
31. It is interesting to ask to which extent imagining a subjective perspective involves imagining a
subject. It seems that we need not be in any way specific about the identity of such a subject
when visualising – although we may also be very specific in the form of additional suppositions
(Martin 2003, 411).
32. He does not explicitly comment on how to characterise experiential imagination. But there is no
reason to suspect that he would reject premiss (iii.2).
33. Again, this is false for disjunctivism, according to which perception-like hallucinations are
non-commital because of their lack of any presentational elements. This means, among other
things, that the intentionalist proposal of an object-independent non-neutrality of perceptions
cannot be used to argue against the disjunctivist view that the non-neutrality of perceptions
is due to their being constituted by their objects (and, indeed, vice versa). What we have
here are two rival accounts of perceptual commitment, which are so far diactically on a par.
The last section of the paper is meant to change the balance concerning this issue in favour
of intentionalism.
25. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003, 28) also do not address the issue of subjectivity when they briefly
sketch Martin’s motivation for endorsing thesis (ii).
26. See also Peacocke’s (1985) discussion of Wittgenstein’s example of King’s College on fire.
27. See also the similar point against the Dependency Thesis made by Currie and Ravenscroft
(2003, 27ff.).
28. The process of photo-copying, which does not involve any such perspective onto the repro-
duced piece of paper, is perhaps an even better illustration of the kind of representation pertain-
ing to experiential imagination (as proposed by Martin in a personal discussion about how best
to understand Hume’s Copy Principle).
29. This idea is not new. In particular, Hume’s Copy Principle may be read as claiming pretty much
the same if applied to the case of imagining.
30. Reference to the kind of representation at issue promises also to illuminate why episodes of
visualising often possess a lesser degree of repleteness, determinacy or intensity than episodes
of seeing. Just as the reproduction of a painting may lead to the loss of some of these qualities,
imagining perceiving something may have this effect. Martin’s employment – in Martin
(2001) – of the Dependency Thesis in his account of the phenomenological differences
between seeing, visually remembering and visualising provides another example of the expla-
natory force of treating at least some instances of visualising as an instance of experiential
imagination.
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